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The Platform of European Social
NGOs: ideology, division and coalition
PAULINE CULLEN
Department of Sociology, Auxilia Building, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Co.
Kildare, Ireland
ABSTRACT This paper explores the role of ideological division in complicating
collaboration between third sector organizations working to influence European
Union (EU) policy processes. The Social Platform, the largest alliance of social
justice groups working at EU level, is studied to illustrate how a coalition of
ideologically disparate organizations cope with internal tensions that are often
exacerbated by external shifts in the political opportunities available for
mobilization. The alliance is successful at mediating the most significant sources
of ideologically based division. However, the external political context for
mobilization requires coalition members to compete for recognition and resources
available at EU level. The reordering of EU equality legislation and initiatives has
most recently exacerbated a series of competitive dynamics in play across the EU
third sector and has stretched the ability of the coalition to maintain unity among
member organizations.
Introduction
Third sector organizations at national and international levels shape and are
shaped by the opportunities and resources made available by intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs).1 The European Union (EU) is an important target and
terrain for third sector actors from a variety of ideological perspectives eager to
gain access to EU funding and shape the trajectory of policies, which affect their
constituents. Third sector organizations based in Brussels who work to influence
policies and compete to carry out EU-funded projects have developed patterns of
collaboration requiring them to negotiate their differences on ideological issues.
Such collaboration has enabled them to consolidate resources and orchestrate
common campaigns. However, while third sector coalitions are developing shared
social critiques, organizations and identities of resistance, these are often
superficial and unstable bases for coalition. Ideological fault lines within such
coalitions can be transposed onto conflicts over resources, organizational form
and ultimately coalition goals. Such conflicts can be exacerbated by the role
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of political institutions in conflating, endorsing or denying claims for recognition
of particular ideological positions and attendant claims for resources.
EU social non-governmental organizations (NGOs) claim to represent the interests
ofEUcitizens andpartly base their demands for inclusion inEUpolitical processes on
their capacity to diminish the long-debated democratic deficit. In addition, they also
claim expertise in helping policy makers strike a defensible balance between social
and economic aspects of European integration.2 However, EU social NGOs have
been characterized as elite focusedwithweak links to grass root constituents andhave
on this basis been discounted as significant agents in closing the gap between
European citizens and EU policy makers. Scholars also point to the EU funding and
project support these NGOs receive as evidence of their co-optation and inability to
maintain independence from EU policy imperatives.3 EU NGOs have also been
categorized as lacking the critical distance required to mobilize for a radical shift in
EUpolicy andofparticipating in consensus-orientedconsultation processesdevoidof
substantive opportunities for deliberation.4
Such critiques are, however, at best over-simplifications and at worst seriously
misleading.While true that social NGOs have not proved capable to date of securing
radical policy shifts, they have proved themselves able to exert modest pressures for
policy adjustment, and constitute an arena for projecting voices which would
otherwise be entirely absent from EU policy debates. Although organizations have
indeed sometimes appeared ‘cosy’ with the official EU institutions, this does not
amount to incorporation in relation to the sector as a whole. Both constrained and
enabled by overarching structures like the Platform, large organizations have had to
account for the values and beliefs of less powerful groups, albeit from a position of
relative strength. The collective ‘sector’ that has resulted from these interactions has
been anything but monolithic, but has instead involved lively, contentious and
sometimes adversarial processes and relationships.
The case employed to examine these issues involves a coalition of international
NGOs working to influence EU social policy making.5 This coalition, known as the
PlatformofEuropeanSocialNGOs (thePlatform),was formed in1994withEUfunds
to build strategic alliances between NGO actors and EU officials. The Platform now
numbers 42 EU social NGOs and although ideologically diverse, NGO members
share a common focus on social change and a shared agenda to influence EU public
policy processes. Since its establishment, the Platform has become a broker for the
reorganization of consultative arrangements between EUNGO networks and the EU
institutions.
Ideological differences between coalition members are a central component of
such interactions. They also play an important part in shaping the internal dynamics
of this coalition and have strained the ability of Platform members to collaborate.
An enduring source of tension is the insistence of the women’s rights NGO, the
European Women’s Lobby (EWL), that gender inequality be recognized by the
Platform as a distinct and horizontal source of discrimination. This contest has its
roots in recognition and redistributive issues raised by the extension of equal
opportunities policies beyond gender issues at EU level to include initiatives to
combat discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability,
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age or sexual orientation. The elaboration of EU competence in these areas was
accompanied by a reconfiguration of funding for NGOs and the creation of specific
budget lines for 12 NGOs working on areas covered by EU anti-discrimination
legislation. The perception that these organizations now monopolize EU funding
streams has created significant resentment from Platform member NGOs who have
found it difficult to reintegrate their organizations into EU funding priorities. In this
article, interview data and analyses of the communications of NGO actors and EU
officials are used to examine the tensions arising between Platformmembers, the role
of the EU political context in shaping these divisions and the challenges facing NGO
collaboration at EU level. EU social NGOs experience two forms of contest. The first
takes place between theEuropeanCommission and theNGOcommunity and focuses
on whether social NGOs are different from other interest groups and is linked to EU
efforts to acquire legitimacy. The second contest occurs within the NGO community
where competing ideological priorities are debated and is related to internal
competitions between NGOs for funding and access to policy makers. While there
exists a third ideological conflict between advocacy and service-delivery NGOs,
space does not permit a discussion here. These contests are shaped by internal and
external mechanisms. External mechanisms include selective incorporation of
specific NGOs and institutional structuring of opportunities and threats to NGO
mobilization by the European Commission. Internal mechanisms include efforts by
NGO leaders to manage conflict through strategies of issue avoidance and the
production of campaigns, and use of strategies aimed at highlighting shared values
rather than ideological differences.
Using these empirical materials, this paper examines the efforts of the Platform
to manage internal divisions rooted in ideological and resource-based contests.
Section two contextualizes the preceding discussion with an overview of the
origins of the coalition, its membership and predominant mechanism of
engagement with EU operatives known as the civil dialogue. Civil dialogue, a
tradition of relations between EU social NGOs and the EU institutions, is detailed
as indicative of the EU approach to NGOs working on social policy and equality
issues. Sections three and four expose and explore the role of ideology in
structuring relations between NGOs and EU institutions and by extension internal
coalition dynamics. Section three details the major cleavages across Platform
membership, and examines how a reordering of EU equality legislation, initiatives
and attendant funding streams has triggered defensive and strategic dynamics
among the coalition’s diverse membership. Section four explores how coalition
efforts to craft a common position on the revision of EU equality legislation
resurrected ideological disagreements between social NGOs on the weight
assigned by the coalition and the EU to various dimensions of discrimination. This
case also illustrates how advocacy around EU equality and anti-discrimination
legislation requires organizations to articulate and engage with contested
definitional issues on the sources of and remedies to different forms of
discrimination and the appropriate strategies to be employed to pursue the goal of
equality. EU social NGOs, in addition, receive important funding from EU
programmes associated with EU anti-discrimination and equality law. Finally,
the platform of european social ngos
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section five documents how the Platform works to manage its—at times—
adversarial dynamics and argues that while significant ideological and strategic
divisions continue to shape relations between organizations, collaboration remains
a popular strategy deemed by many NGOs as an essential counterweight to the real
politik of national governments and the lobbying of economic interests.
NGOs are recognized here as important contexts for ideological expression and
debate, and as possessing the capacity to influence broader political discourse and
ultimately policy formulation. The EU understood here as a multilevel political
opportunity structure (POS) acts to configure patterns of NGO mobilization and
coalition. The POS is the context within which NGOs gain access to policy
processes, or in other words how open or closed IGOs are to NGOs seeking to
influence policy making. At EU level, the POS varies depending on the specific
organ of governance, the stage of the policy cycle and issue area targeted.6
Inwhat follows, the emergence and consolidation of the Platformwill be portrayed
as a significant development in cooperative relations between European third sector
organizations. Its development marks a departure for the EU in its recognition of
NGOs as potential stakeholders in policy debates, conduits to EU citizens and as sites
for the articulation of EU projects. This analysis of the Platform will illustrate,
however, that such cooperation has only been possible because the Platform has
developed tactics and strategies for coping with a range of ideational tensions often
Box 1: Significant events in the development of the platform of European social NGOs 1994–2009
1994 Original 9 NGOmembers meet to discuss EU Commission proposals on Social
Policy.
1995 17 NGOs are given funding by the EU Commission to launch a debate on civil
dialogue.
1997 Membership now 25. First membership survey and internal review of the
Platform; Platform holds first bi-annual meeting with Commission; Platform
launches website and holds a Second European Social Policy Forum.
1998 Internal divisions arise over the adoption of a values statement.
2000 Membership now 30; Platform holds first General Assembly in Stockholm and
adopts formal legal status.
2003 The Platform participates in EU treaty debates but internal divisions remain
over the content of the proposed revision of the EU legal architecture.
2004 Platform internal debates over membership criteria and new EU funding
guidelines reach crises point. Platform secures new funding source.
2005 Platform rationalises secretariat and reforms management structures; Appoints
new director and adopts new decision making apparatus.
2008–2009 Membership now 42 organisations, Platform re-launches website and adopts a
new communication strategy; policy engagement includes the revision of EU
anti-discrimination law, and a European economic recovery programme.
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exacerbated by the complex and fractured character of the POS that are encountered.
An examination of the Platform also illustrates how states and international
governmental contexts exacerbate divisions between NGOs competing for political
space and access to resources. Contests between members of the EU social NGO
coalition are in addition reflective of long debated ideological and strategic divides
between anti-poverty, family rights, feminist, gay rights and racial justice activists
and organizations. As such, a focus on the Platform sheds light on how third sector
actors can partake in their own forms of ideological production, which can be used to
manufacture consensus across the ideological divide working in turn to challenge or
in some instances legitimize dominant ideological constructs.
The Social Platform, the EU social policy context and civil dialogue
The Platform states that its members ‘are committed to the advancement of the
principles of equality, solidarity, non-discrimination and the promotion and
respect of fundamental rights for all; the promotion of social justice and
participatory democracy by voicing the concerns of its member organisations’.7
Member organizations include both advocacy and social service provider NGOs.8
Since its inception, the Platform had included organizations holding dissimilar
ideological profiles. Family rights and conservative anti-poverty organizations had
allied themselves alongside women’s rights, and anti-racist, lesbian and gay rights
associations. By early 2004, newer members had joined the Platform. Some of the
newer members were from faith-based NGO sectors and were focused less on
service provision than on advocacy on policy issues. From the beginning of the
coalition, disagreements had arisen over issues including proposals to formalize
the Platform in legal terms, the criteria for coalition membership and strategies to
be employed towards achieving the objective of equality. Some of these disputes
had threatened to fracture the alliance. However, by the late 1990s, reforms
including a rationalization of the Platform’s work programme, a formalization of
procedures to elect representatives from its members and the professionalization
of its secretariat had enabled the coalition to endure and mobilize in coherent
campaigns. External threats, including periodic EU funding crises, also created
sources of cross-sectoral solidarity between diverse NGO coalition members eager
to present a united front to EU officials.9
EU social NGOs are constrained by the dynamics of EU social policy making
which are closely guarded by national governments and which generate EU level
programmatic initiatives rather than a framework for the redistribution of
resources. EU social policy has evolved from a period from the mid-1980s to the
early 1990s of relative expansionism in social policy making and the inclusion of
NGOs in policy setting processes to a more recent closed door approach with
fewer opportunities for NGO involvement.
EU policy makers have shifted towards a conception of economic policy that
equates productivity and growth with labour market flexibility, with specific
implications for EU social policy. Under this model, a minimum of social protection
is understood as vital in enabling EU economies to compete in a low cost and
the platform of european social ngos
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deregulated global economic environment. EU social policy from this perspective
should not create any impediments to EU member state efforts to attract economic
investment and should rather support a broader neo-liberal agenda that subordinates
efforts at decommodification to the demands of the flexible labour market.
EU social policy making is accordingly now defined less as a mechanism to provide
social protection and promote social solidarity andmore as a set of processes aimed to
promote productivity and social integration through employment. This is best
illustrated by the EU’s move towards social policy instruments of a non-binding
nature focused on benchmarking and policy comparison rather than policy
imperatives which require member states to implement programmes which
may involve higher ‘costs’ for employers. The PROGRESS initiative is a notable
example. PROGRESS, which provides funding for many Platform members, is
the EU’s employment and social solidarity programme and is tasked in part
with delivering policy on combating discrimination and promoting equality.
EU social NGOs have in turn been drafted into these non-binding policy processes
through a range of consensus-oriented mechanisms for policy consultation and the
elaborationofEUprojects. This said, EUproject fundingmust be applied for annually
amid intense competition.TheEUalsooffersno formal systemofNGOaccreditation.
EU officials have indeed resisted formalizing a system of NGO consultation and as a
result a collage of de facto practices including the civil dialogue has evolved.
The civil dialogue between EU officials and EU social NGOs: consensus or
contestation?
It is generally recognized that the Platform was the first point of contact for the
emergence of the civil dialogue. Civil dialogue is best understood as a loosely
configured tradition of bi-annual meetings between the Platform and the
Commission, a budget line which provides funding for the Platform secretariat and
a collection of—at times—unpredictable invitations to consult on the formulation of
EU policy proposals. This collage of practices is, however, an important component
of the POS for NGOs interested in influencing EU policy makers. It is also the site
uponwhichEUsocialNGOscollaborate andcompete for access toEUpolitical space
and resources and is therefore an important backdrop to this analysis.
While EU social NGOs have consistently participated in these arrangements,
they are constrained by the significant investment of resources required to cultivate
relations, prepare policy submissions and attend meetings. Research also supports
the conclusion that there is a considerable gap between the official EU discourse
about its relationship to civil society or civil dialogue and its actual practice of
consulting citizens and their representatives in third sector organizations.10 Civil
dialogue has also been characterized by a tendency on the part of EU officials to
avoid consultation with NGOs on controversial issues. The quality of civil dialogue
is also in general terms contingent on the EU’s overall commitment to the
development of EU social policies. The European Commission, in the past a key
actor in the expansion of social policy, presently illustrates little support or capacity
for an ambitious EU social policy agenda or civil dialogue.11 This said, civil
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dialogue has provided ideational and political opportunities for NGOs to engage in
EU policy debates. Research does also confirm that despite significant shared
political socialization and interchange between individuals working as NGO
professionals and then as EU officials (and vice versa), there exists considerable
social and ideological distance between EU officials and NGO activists. While
NGO actors have worked to differentiate their status as distinct from business
interests, who routinely lobby the European institutions, NGOs still face obstacles
in this regard.
Many Senior Commission officials remain sceptical of NGO claims to represent
the public interest and continue instead to view them as primarily lobbyists
representing narrow constituents.12 Officials often seem to view social NGOs as
similar to private interests, as sources of technical information and as vehicles to sell
the EU to EU citizens. Interviews with EU officials and analysis of communications
support the assumption that theEuropeanCommission frames the role ofNGOsmore
generally as that of ‘Communicating Europe’.13 This perspective does not require the
involvement of stakeholders (includingNGOs) in the framing and implementation of
policy. Rather NGOs are conceived as occasional consultants and cheerleaders for
European integration.
The European Commission programme on Active Citizenship, currently funding
thePlatform, fitswith this formulation. This programme’smain purpose is to promote
and spread EU values and objectives and to bring citizens closer to the European
institutions though conferences, seminars, workshops, networking, exchanges of
experience and education and training events. The alternative framing most
associated with the EU social NGO community has been termed Democratizing
Democracy. This perspective begins froma different vantage point and implies both a
crisis of representative democracy and a democratic deficit at EU level. Minorities
and the disadvantaged are central to this formulation; their engagement and
representation are seen as a direct result of the potential for a form of participatory
democracy to deliver developmental benefits. This requires financial support for
relevant civil society organizations to build the capacity for engagement among
European citizens.14 NGO efforts, including social NGOs, to resist the demobilizing
aspect of the EU’s framing require coherent and strategic campaigns to assert
alternative framingwhich combines strong value-based statementswith concrete and
credible solutions for an alternative policy trajectory. A key challenge then for the
Platform remains keeping its diversemembership onmessage, cohesive and united in
its efforts to resist Commission attempts to use the coalition merely to legitimize EU
policies.
Ideological and strategic imperatives underlying EU policy and practice towards
social NGOs have profound implications for dynamics of competition and alliance
across the NGO sector. EU consultative practices including civil dialogue that
privilege professionalized NGOs have worked to marginalize organizations with a
poorer ideological and strategic fit and contribute to tensions across the NGO sector,
ultimately undermining NGO efforts at cross-issue mobilization. In addition, the
EU’s uneven and contradictory legal framework for promoting equality and anti-
discrimination has exacerbated ideological divisions among NGOs advocating for
the platform of european social ngos
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different equality agendas.15 Both aspects of the POS work to inhibit the articulation
of diverse claims and the construction of holistic campaignswhile triggering strategic
and defensive dynamics within which ideology plays a significant role.
The Platform: a house divided and the struggle for coherence and solidarity
The topography of the coalition is a complex one with a large and diverse
membership generating ideological, functional and strategic cleavages that
overlap and intersect with micro-political dynamics and interpersonal histories.
That said, the main fault lines within the coalition rest on distinctions between
older service-oriented faith-based/disability NGOs and newer EU-funded
advocacy organizations; within the community of NGOs advocating for different
forms of equality and between those organizations receiving EU operational
support and those choosing to remain independent of EU monies. Organizations
interested in collaboration must then navigate ideologically rooted disagreements
on issues including the definition of the family unit, gender roles, the
conceptualization of and strategic approach to equality, and the merits of
dependence on EU funds. Such contests invoke deeply held convictions regarding
the nature of systems of stratification, the politics of recognition, and redistribution
and attendant claims for the privileging by institutions of one form of disadvantage
over another. Ideological divides are made explicit in debates about issues
including membership criteria, the coalition’s organizational rules, and stated
vision and Platform campaigns to influence EU social and equality policy agendas.
As mentioned above, efforts to improve the inclusivity of the coalition swelled its
ranks to include a greater proportion of service providers and faith-based
organizations with direct consequences for patterns of collaboration and conflict.
Reacting to the shift in the ideological complexion of the coalition, oneNGOdirector
stated that ‘The Platform has become ideologically diverse yet we continue to engage
in majority voting on contentious issues, ignoring the fact that there are fundamental
disagreements. This is not a sustainable strategy.’ The Platform’s 2004 general
assembly,marked by an intense debate about applications, illustrates these dynamics.
Caritas, a Catholic organization, had suggested an Italian faith-based organization
European Association of Catholic Families for membership. The application was
vetoed by the International Lesbian, Gay,Bisexual, Trans and IntersexAssociation –
Europe (ILGA) and the feminist NGO, the EWL. The director of Caritas commented
that a refusal to admit this organization was tantamount to ‘prejudice’ on behalf
of other networks. The coordinator of the feminist NGO, the EWL, a founding
member of the Platform, assessed the debate on membership criteria commenting
‘We decided to take an important stand here and to acknowledge that some of our
“colleagues” will never agree with our ideological position’.
Interviews conducted with the EWL in November 2007 suggest that ideological
distance between the women’s rights NGO and many Platform members remains a
significant source of contention within the coalition. Referencing long debated
disagreements over the adoption of a values statement by the Platform members, the
former EWL coordinator stated, ‘we all knew that we had to revisit this issue of what
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we stand for and how we define equality but not at the expense of disappearing
[seriously downgrading the profile of] women which was basically the agenda of
many of the other organisations’. While faith-based and feminist organizations were
predictably at odds on a variety of ideologically rooted issues, the ILGA and the
European Network Against Racism (ENAR) were also critics of the EWL’s
‘disproportionate clout with EU officials and within the coalition’. Both NGOs have
battled with the EWL on the position that gender inequality should command within
Platform policy statements. From her perspective, the EWL coordinator suggested
that her organization ‘had been submitting the same amendments to the Platform for
ten years, nothing is automatic, every document has to be read or gender will not be
included as a specific issue’. Platform elections for the management committee in
2005had been ‘a disaster in terms of gender balance’. The acting director added that a
proposal to include gender parity in the Platform statutes had been grudgingly
accepted by Platform members, however, the process of raising and lobbying on the
issue had been a marginalizing experience.16
Ideological disputes within the Platform are intrinsically linked to the political
opportunities for individual NGOs to mobilize on their respective policy areas. At
EU level, the role that the Commission plays in the certification and decertification
of policy issues can shift the playing field for social NGOs, creating new
opportunities and threatening previously established resource streams. Such
resource contests can be transposed over ideological divisions betweenNGOs.How
haveNGOs handled these divisions? SomeNGO respondents includingCaritas and
Solidar, both long-established European NGOs involved in development and
anti-poverty, have been open in acknowledging their positions on opposite sides of
the ideological spectrum and their past contests for Commission support. These
contests were, however, exacerbated by shifts in EU financial regulations that
condense funding streams and reconfigured traditional secure forms of EU funding
for long-established development, social service and family rights NGOs.17 Indeed,
some smaller organizations suggested that a few privileged NGOs managed to
escape the punitive affects of the financial changes. The large core-funded NGOs
established to influence EU policy including the European Anti-Poverty Network
(EAPN) and the EWL admit that their ‘privileged’ position relative to other NGO
sectors has insulated them from some of the most significant cutbacks. Some
Platform members were particularly critical of organizations like the EWL, the
EAPN and other core-funded coalition NGOs for their ‘cosy’ relationships to the
EU institutions, suggesting that they pander to the EU’s agenda rather than
following their constituent’s lead. Other Platform members who have found a
relative safe haven are those included under the Commission’s anti-discrimination
initiatives. Tensions continue within the Platform between the funded NGOs
organizations and those that are now a poor fit with EU funding priorities.
Competitions for funding aside, shifts in EU policies on equality and
discrimination have generated dynamics of inclusion/exclusion among Platform
members advocating for different equality agendas.18 From the EWL perspective,
then, gender inequality now linked to non-binding legislative processes was being
neglected in the wake of the EU’s interest in developing anti-discrimination policy
the platform of european social ngos
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on race, disability and sexual orientation. According to the EWL coordinator,
‘For policy makers gender inequity is now solved as a source of discrimination,
other forms of disadvantage have eclipsed the need to privilege gender as a policy
area’. The anti-discrimination agenda and itsNGOplayers had fromher perspective
been developed at the expense of the gender equality unit. The adoption of new
legislation in particular to combat racial discrimination was also indicative of how
gender equality legislation was being left further behind. For the EWL, ‘The
Commission simply provides more logistical, research and programmatic support
to the anti-discrimination NGOs because their work is linked to legislation not the
soft processes associated now with gender equality’. The European year for Equal
Opportunities held in 2007 was cited as an example where women’s issues were
ignored while organizations working on racial and ethnic discrimination—namely
another Platformmember, theENAR—had benefited significantly from the funding
opportunities and publicity surrounding the year.
The proposed further revision of EU equality and anti-discrimination
legislation, an issue in which all Platform members share an important stake,
further demonstrates how ideological divisions can produce territorial reflexes,
making collaboration difficult. This legislation and its associated programme
1975–1986 Working from the original EC treaty of 1957 laws prohibiting discrimination
on equal pay and equal treatment of men and women in employment, training
and social security are implemented.
1997 EC Member States approve unanimously the Treaty of Amsterdam. Article
13 of the new Treaty grants the Community new powers to combat
discrimination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.
1999 Two new EC laws are adopted on the basis of Article 13 the Racial Equality
Directive, 2000/43/EC, which implements the principle of equal treatment
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin and the Employment
Equality Directive, 2000/78/EC which establishes a general framework for
equal treatment in employment and occupation.
2000 Anti-discrimination laws to protect people being discriminated against on
the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or
sexual orientation are agreed by all EU countries.
2009 The European Parliament passes a bill banning discrimination on the basis of
age, disability, sexual orientation, belief or religion extending discrimination
protection beyond the labour market to goods and services as well as to other
areas of life such as education, health, social protection and social security.
Sexual or gender based discrimination is not included. The bill now requires
unanimous approval by Member States.
Box 2: Significant events in the development of the EU anti-discrimination legislation
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PROGRESS, mentioned above, is widely acknowledged as of potential
significance for legal and social change across many European countries and is
of particular import for organizations looking to pressure member states to expand
and strengthen protections for their constituents. The challenge for the Platform
rested in negotiating between organizations most recently covered by EU anti-
discrimination initiatives, including those representing racial and ethnic
minorities, sexual orientation as a source of discrimination and disability rights,
the EWL, eager to have gender included in the bill and service providers holding
the view that they stood to gain the least from an aggressive campaign to shape the
content of the legislation. Faith-based organizations in line with opposition from
religious groupings and states including Poland and Malta were notably
uncomfortable with proposals included in the legislation, which they perceived to
strengthen the rights of sexual minorities and open religious organizations up to
charges of discrimination.
Equality and non-discrimination: contention and collaboration
The Platform adopted its first common position on the proposals for new EU equality
and non-discrimination legislation in October 2007.19 The possibility of concrete
legislation affecting a wide range of constituents and increasing resistance from
member states claiming that the proposed laws would interfere in national social
policies and prove costly to employers created impetus for organizations to
collaborate on the issue. As the Platform director noted ‘The NGO sector recognized
the enormous impact that a new initiative could have and they had to be coordinated
because they were going to be played off one another’. The director of ILGA played
an important role, convening a series of bilateral meetings with smaller numbers of
organizations to debate the content of the position enabling organizations to
deliberate and avoid for the most part open confrontation over differences in
perspective on the European Commission’s planned initiative.
Importantly, a tacit agreement between ILGA and the EWL to put aside their
disagreement on gender equality resulted in the adoption of the common statement.
The document advocates for the recognition of the concept of multiple
discrimination, the relationship between social policies and equality, and the
relative comprehensiveness of a new ‘Race Equality Directive’, compared to other
EU legislation, which ‘creates an unacceptable hierarchy of protection’.20
In ideological terms, the inclusion of the concept of multiple discrimination
represents a shift within the core group of Platformmembersmost vested in equality
issues towards recognizing the constitutive and multiple dimensions of inequal-
ities.21Workshops around the concept provided a space to consider questions about
the relations and connections between different forms of diversity and
discrimination, and created some sense of solidarity and reciprocity around
strengthening EU policies in this area. Longer established anti-poverty and social
service provider NGOs remained on the margins of these debates considering them
irrelevant or at odds with the values held by their constituents.
the platform of european social ngos
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Aware of the need to draw support from social service NGOs and anti-poverty
organizations, the Platform president launched a campaign, which connected
‘decent’ social standards to the equality agenda. This strategy was aimed at
encouraging social NGOs to make the link between their respective platforms
reinforcing the notion that equality as a goal could not be achieved in the absence
of strong anti-poverty policies and comprehensive social services and supports.
In formal terms, the Platform states that it ‘acts a vehicle for its member
organizations to express their shared values and shape these into a strong voice for
the social NGO sector’.22 Faced with a membership that was in danger of
increasing factionalization, the Platform’s 2008 strategic plan emphasized three
major objectives: ‘strengthening the sector, reinforcing participatory democracy
and shaping social Europe’.23 The transversal nature of these objectives is aimed
at supporting the construction of a loosely configured collective agenda
emphasizing the EU social NGO sector as a coherent and decisive actor at
European level invested in common goals, transparent and democratic practice
and therefore qualified to shape the trajectory of EU social policy. This collective
agenda is not simply aimed at external audiences but is rather generative of a
form of trust which allows most members to bracket their ideological differences
when required.
However, ideological differences cannot be disregarded. When the Platform
generates common positions that suggest a privileging of some organizational
agendas and correspondingly some ideologies over others, problems arise.
Three working groups constituted to deliver upon the strategic plan objectives,
Social Policy, the Fundamental Rights and Non-Discrimination, and a Services
of General Interest (dedicated to resisting EU policy on deregulation in the area
of public and social services), had contributed to a silo effect among the
membership concentrating like-minded organizations and providing fewer
opportunities for cross-sectorial communication. The later working group had in
itself become a source of tension in the Platform. Some social service provider
NGOs, particularly those in the disability arena, suggested that they were unsure if
they could support the Platform’s position on this issue. Frustrated with
unsatisfactory relations with the state, their ownmembers had raised the notion that
private enterprise could in fact be a more transparent and reliable
partnership. While this represents a minority position within the Platform, it
indicates the considerable ideological and strategic divide between organizations
on major issues and the potential for such divisions to fracture hard-won
consensus.
The Platform: ideological diversity, contestation and collective mobilization
NGOs holding diverse perspectives and collaborating at EU level provide an
interesting case to examine the role of ideology as a structuring element with the
potential to simultaneously divide and/or unify associations navigating a
multilevel political terrain. Pace Warleigh (2001), Monaghan (2008) and Kroger
(2008), an implicit or explicit map of ideologies is argued here to require inclusion
pauline cullen
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of civil society actors including NGOs as significant politicizers, instigators and
bridges into diverse constituencies of interest. In this regard, rather than seen as the
pawns of policy makers, NGOs are acknowledged as agentive and possessing the
capacity to shape political language and influence policy trajectories. In addition,
this work treats supranational institutions like the EU as a multilevel POS, which
shapes the strategies and, by extension, the dynamics of coalition and conflict
among NGOs seeking access to policy-making contexts and resources.
As a context for NGO mobilization, the EU has been characterized by
Greenwood as a distinctive brand of neo-pluralism, understaffed for its policy
reach, deficient in representative democracy and as a consequence, dependent on
interest groups for expertise and on NGOs in particular to generate legitimacy by
acting as conduits to European publics.24 The analysis presented here is resonant
with Greenwood’s account, but goes beyond it in problematizing the issues of
expertise and knowledge brokerage, and attending more explicitly to distributional
issues as they relate to NGOs, especially the distinction between large and small
groups. We have seen that political considerations are ubiquitous, not just in the
sense that the ‘external’ POS’s construction strongly shapes the possibilities for
NGOs’ engagement with policy, but also in the sense that internal tensions
between members help determine what actions and policies are seen as feasible
and desirable. As a result, relationships are much more messy and contested than
the clean language of ‘interest groups’ favoured by Greenwood seems to imply.
So far, EU social NGOs collaborating to influence EU social policy have faced
obstacles in the form of internal conflict and external social and political conditions,
both ofwhich interact to disrupt the power of the coalition to promote social change.
For EU social NGOs, creating internal unity and launching common campaigns
requires a focus upon a small number of clearly defined and least divisive issues.
This is a difficult task for ideologically diverse organizationsworking in a crowded,
competitive and resource-poor environment such as the EU. Some EU NGO
activists also assert that the cost of maintaining a united front viewed as the
production of campaigns based on a high level of generality has rendered the
coalition toothless while allowing its most powerful members to control the agenda
and bolster their ‘privileged’ position with their institutional sponsors. Dissimilar
perspectives across the Platform now require significant investment by Platform
leaders to anticipate sources of division and promote sufficiently resonant
objectives to sustain collaboration. Complicating efforts to sustain internal
solidarity are increasing competitions between organizations to retain the EU’s
focus on the various forms of disadvantage and oppression they claim to represent
and to found claims to EU resources on the basis of these forms of recognition.
Platformmembers’ recent efforts to embrace the concept ofmultiple discrimination
signal an attempt to transcend ideological divides in pursuit of a coordinated and
strategic response to the uneven development and contradictory nature of EU
equality and anti-discrimination policy.However, EUpractices including operating
competing policy units for different dimensions of inequality, poverty and
discrimination militate against NGO efforts at cross-issue mobilization, generating
instead competitive and exclusive dynamics. In this environment, organizations
the platform of european social ngos
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who differ in ideological terms along fault lines of race, class, gender, sexuality, age
and able-bodiness invest in protecting their constituents from displacement from
the EU policy agenda rather than collaboration. Platform efforts to connect equality
issues with broader anti-poverty and social justice concerns have also met with
resistance from organizations who find little common ideological ground or
strategic merit in pursuing such a holistic approach to the EU social policy agenda.
While the Platform remains a site of EU third sector collaboration, it remains
vulnerable to the demobilizing and divisive aspects of working at EU level. Global
economic recession and the periodic mobilization of European citizens at national
level has also raised the stakes for EU social NGOs to remain relevant sites for the
critique of EU policy agendas. Recent attempts by EU member state governments
and economic interests to abandon the revision of EU equality legislation as too
costly a burden for business during economic recession and the omission of any
reference to social policy as part of a European recovery plan may provide new
impetus for NGO collaboration across ideological divides. The Platform may in
fact provide the ‘free space’ to facilitate an open debate, which could in turn
generate a source of renewed commitment among EU social NGOs to set aside
their ideological differences and advance the transformative policies required to
deal with the complex realities of inequality, discrimination and disadvantage.
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